1. Determinate or indeterminate sentence

2. Sentence of probation

3. Retroactivity of legislation

4. Miscellaneous

1. Determinate or indeterminate sentence

For purposes of the indeterminacy requirement in subsection (4) of this section, it matters not when the underlying offenses occurred in relation to each other or that some of the relevant charges were brought via charging documents; subsection (4) is broad enough that it theoretically could be read to impose an indeterminacy requirement upon a Class III, Class IIIA, or Class IV felony sentence imposed consecutively or concurrently with a Class I, IA, IB, IC, ID, II, or IIA felony sentence that is already in progress. What matters under subsection (4) is that the sentences for those offenses are imposed consecutively or concurrently to each other. State v. Starks, 308 Neb. 527, 955 N.W.2d 313 (2021).

It is plain error under subsection (4) of this section for a sentencing court to order determinate sentences for three Class IV felonies to be imposed consecutively with a Class IIA felony sentence. State v. Starks, 308 Neb. 527, 955 N.W.2d 313 (2021).

A sentence of imprisonment upon revocation from post-release supervision is a determinate sentence within the meaning of this section. State v. Galvan, 305 Neb. 513, 941 N.W.2d 183 (2020).

Where the district court sentenced a defendant for a Class II felony and imposed a concurrent sentence for a Class IV felony for offenses occurring in 2017, the court plainly erred by imposing a determinate sentence rather than an indeterminate sentence for the Class IV felony. State v. Guzman, 305 Neb. 376, 940 N.W.2d 552 (2020).

A determinate sentence, as used in subdivision (1)(a) of this section, is imposed when the defendant is sentenced to a single term of years. State v. Vanness, 300 Neb. 159, 912 N.W.2d 736 (2018).

A determinate sentence is imposed when the defendant is sentenced to a single term of years, such as a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment. In contrast, when imposing an indeterminate sentence, a sentencing court ordinarily articulates either a minimum term and maximum term or a range of time for which a defendant is to be incarcerated. State v. Artis, 296 Neb. 172, 893 N.W.2d 421 (2017).

In Nebraska, the fact that the minimum term and maximum term of a sentence are the same does not affect the sentence's status as an indeterminate sentence. State v. Artis, 296 Neb. 172, 893 N.W.2d 421 (2017).

A defendant's sentence on a Class IIIA felony needed to be an indeterminate sentence because the defendant was also sentenced on Class II felonies. State v. Wells, 28 Neb. App. 118, 940 N.W.2d 847 (2020).

A defendant's sentences on various misdemeanors needed to be indeterminate sentences pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, because the defendant was also sentenced on Class II felonies. State v. Wells, 28 Neb. App. 118, 940 N.W.2d 847 (2020).

2. Sentence of probation

This section encompasses a policy decision by the Legislature favoring probationary sentences for Class IV felonies, and findings required under this section do not necessarily apply to sentencing decisions pertaining to higher-level offenses. State v. McGovern, 311 Neb. 705, 974 N.W.2d 595 (2022).

A determination of whether there are substantial and compelling reasons under subdivision (2)(c) of this section is within the trial court's discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Baxter, 295 Neb. 496, 888 N.W.2d 726 (2017).

The court may fulfill the requirement of subsection (3) of this section to state its reasoning on the record by a combination of the sentencing hearing and sentencing order. State v. Baxter, 295 Neb. 496, 888 N.W.2d 726 (2017).

The court's determination of substantial and compelling reasons under subdivision (2)(c) of this section should be based on a review of the record, including the presentence investigation report and the record of the trial, and its determination must be supported by such record. State v. Baxter, 295 Neb. 496, 888 N.W.2d 726 (2017).

3. Retroactivity of legislation

The trial court did not plainly err by failing to impose an indeterminate sentence where an information alleged that a Class IIIA felony occurred over a period of time both before and after August 30, 2015; the evidence about when the assaults occurred could cover dates before and after August 30; and the jury did not make a specific finding demonstrating that it found the offense was committed after August 30. State v. Mora, 298 Neb. 185, 903 N.W.2d 244 (2017).

The defendant's sentence of 2 years' imprisonment with a 12-month period of post-release supervision for possession of a controlled substance was vacated pursuant to State v. Randolph, 186 Neb. 297, 183 N.W.2d 225 (1971), where the defendant was sentenced concurrently for two Class IV felonies and a Class W misdemeanor and where after sentencing, but while the matter was pending on appeal, 2016 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1094, struck section 29-2260(5) and added subsection (4) of this section, which precluded post-release supervision. State v. Chacon, 296 Neb. 203, 894 N.W.2d 238 (2017).

Under the nonretroactive provision of section 28-105(7), the changes made in this section to the penalties for Class IV felony convictions by 2015 Neb. Laws, L.B. 605, do not apply to any offense committed before August 30, 2015. State v. Benavides, 294 Neb. 902, 884 N.W.2d 923 (2016).

It is clear that the Legislature did not intend to apply this section retroactively. State v. Raatz, 294 Neb. 852, 885 N.W.2d 38 (2016).

4. Miscellaneous

The statutory provisions of this section and section 28-105 relating to post-release supervision are mandatory, and a sentence that fails to impose post-release supervision when required is an appropriate matter for an appellate court's discretionary plain error review. State v. Roth, 311 Neb. 1007, 977 N.W.2d 221 (2022).

A transfer from juvenile court to criminal court does not eliminate the possibility of disposition under the juvenile code. In re Interest of Steven S., 299 Neb. 447, 908 N.W.2d 391 (2018).

Section 29-2204 and subsection (4) of this section do not require a sentence for a Class IV felony to have a minimum term less than the maximum term. State v. Artis, 296 Neb. 172, 893 N.W.2d 421 (2017).

If a defendant was previously subject to parole under preexisting sentences and subsequently sentenced in other cases either concurrently or consecutively to the prior sentences, subsection (4) of this section prevents the defendant from being subject to post-release supervision. State v. Lillard, 27 Neb. App. 824, 937 N.W.2d 1 (2019).

Subsection (4) of this section applies in a situation where sentences are imposed and the defendant is serving preexisting sentences. State v. Lillard, 27 Neb. App. 824, 937 N.W.2d 1 (2019).