This section as it existed in 1975 authorized a city of the first class to create a water district to extend water service within the city limit without giving notice of the creation of the district to property owners affected. First Assembly of God Church v. City of Scottsbluff, 203 Neb. 452, 279 N.W.2d 126 (1979).
To the extent the opinion in Matzke v. City of Seward, 193 Neb. 211, 226 N.W.2d 340 (1975), may imply that a city of the first class had no authority to create a water extension district under this section and is in conflict with this case, it is overruled. First Assembly of God Church v. City of Scottsbluff, 203 Neb. 452, 279 N.W.2d 126 (1979).
Sections 16-667 to 16-670 provide procedures for construction and financing for water mains in a water district. Matzke v. City of Seward, 193 Neb. 211, 226 N.W.2d 340 (1975).
A city of the first class has statutory authority to create water district and to levy assessments for the payment of the cost thereof. Wiborg v. City of Norfolk, 176 Neb. 825, 127 N.W.2d 499 (1964).
Power to construct local improvements and levy special assessments is strictly construed. Besack v. City of Beatrice, 154 Neb. 142, 47 N.W.2d 356 (1951).
It is the duty of a city issuing warrants in payment of special improvements to create a fund for payment of the warrants and to collect special assessments to retire the same, and upon failure to do so, the warrants become general obligations of the city. Miller v. City of Scottsbluff, 133 Neb. 547, 276 N.W. 158 (1937).
City has independent and complete authority to erect, extend, or improve and maintain a sewer system and to issue bonds in payment thereof, even though such bonds are not the general obligation of the city. State ex rel. City of Columbus v. Price, 127 Neb. 132, 254 N.W. 889 (1934).
Where a city has power to contract for pipe, but the manner of so exercising the contract is irregular, and where such city purchases and retains such pipe, there being no fraud shown, such contract is not ultra vires and a taxpayer will not be permitted by suit to prevent the council's allowance of the seller's claim therefor. Stickel Lumber Company v. City of Kearney, 103 Neb. 636, 173 N.W. 595 (1919).